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Is the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of
Goods Achieving Uniformity?

I. INTRODUCTION

Many conmmentators are now suggesting that the Vienna Convention on the
International Sale of Goods' (hereafter "Convention"), 10 years after it has come into
force, mightbe failing to accomplish its task ofbringing uniformity and predictability
to international sales law. Some commentators argue that the Convention not only
fails at its goal of bringing uniformity, but actually harms this goal.' While these
commentators point out difficulties with the Convention's ability to bring

predictability to international sales law, these difficulties were known when the
Convention was created and, furthermore, are not fatal to the usefulness of the
Convention.
In general, the Convention governs contracts forthe sale of goods between parties
from different countries that have signed the Convention.3 It supplants the domestic
law of nations as to certain international sales in two areas: 1)the formation of sales
contracts and 2) the rights and obligations of the parties to sales contracts.4
Drafted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law

(UNCITRAL) the Convention was adopted by a diplomatic conference in Vienna in
1980. International groups had been trying to create a uniform law for the
international sale ofgoods since 1930.' Two previous attempts to unify international
sales law were heavily influenced by the Civil Law traditions ofWestern Europe, to
the neglect ofthe commn law and other world legal traditions, and consequently
failed to obtain worldwide approval. Therefore, UNCITRAL set out to draft a set of
laws that would consider the views of a wider array of countries. The result was the

Convention, which subsequently came into force for eleven countries, including the
United States, on January 1,1988. As ofAugust 20, 1999, there were 57 signataries
to the Convention, albeit some with reservations.6
To examine the Convention, a good starting point isjurisdiction. Whenever there
is a sale of goods between two parties who have their principal place of business in
1. 15 U.S.C.A. Appendix (West Supp. 1997).
2. See Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonizationin International
Commercial Law, 39 Va. J. Int'l L. 743 (1999); James E. Bailey, Facing the Truth: Seeing the
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale ofGoods as an Obstacle to a Uniform Law of
International Sales, 32 Cornell Int'l LJ.273 (1999); Steven Walt, Novelty and the Risks of Uniform
Sales Law, 39 Va. J.Int'l L 671 (1999).
3. The Convention does allow reservations to be made and there are other qualifications but this
will be discussed further in the paper.
4. Convention art. 4.
5. The two main previous attempts were the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods
(ULIS) and the Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale ofGoods (ULF).
For a discussion of this history see Franco Ferrari,
Uniform Interpretation of The 1980 Uniform Sales
Law, 24 Ga. J. of Int'l & Comp. L 183, 189 (1994-95).
6. See the Convention database created by Pace University (visited Jan. 1, 2000)
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu>.
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different contracting states, the Convention applies unless there is an exception! The
Convention covers commercial purchases of goods, but not "goods bought 'for
8
personal, family or household use." Article 4 limits the Convention's scope to the
formation ofthe contract and the rights and obligations of the buyers and sellers. The
Convention does not govern some controversial areas of the law that the UNCITRAL
9
committee failed to agree upon, such as validity ofthe contract and products liability.
Finally, the Convention strongly recognizes the principle offreedom of contract and
0
allows parties to contract out ofanyprovision. In fact, it allows the parties to opt out
ofthe Convention altogether." In the United States, the Convention isa self-executing
2
treaty; this means that any time its terms are met, the court must apply it.'
Il. THE DIFFICULTIES OF ACHIEVING UNIFORM PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

Creating uniform private international law is an attractive idea. When
transacting business with someone from a foreign country, one need not be aware
of all the vagaries of the foreign system, but only the one system of law that the
whole world transacts business upon. This decreases the legal risk inherent in
transacting business on an international scale and consequently creates more
profitability in international trade.
There are, however, many obstacles to achieving this utopian notion of a
singular law.'" Getting many nations to agree to a system of law that is foreign to
7. The Convention doesallow reservations tobe made. TheU.S. made an Article 95 reservation
opting out of Article 1(i)(b) of the Convention. Adopting Article I(1)(b) would have meant that the
Convention would apply to contracts between a U.S. party and a party from a non-contracting state
when the conflict oflaw rules led to the application ofU.S. law. Perhaps the more important reservation
that is allowed is an Article 92 reservation. This allows a state to declare it will not be bound by Part
I1(Contract Formation) or that it will not be bound by Part Ill (Sale ofGoods) ofthe Convention. Thus
far only the Scandinavian countries have opted out of Part I!of the Convention and no countries have
opted out ofPart Ill. The Scandinavian countries also made an Article 94 declaration that allows these
countries to apply their own transnational laws between themselves and not the Convention. The
reservations allowed are found in Part IV of the Convention. For a full list of the countries that have
made reservations, see the Convention database, supra note 6.
8. Convention arts. 2 and 3 set the parameters for which goods come within the ambit of the
Convention. The Convention excludes, among other items, investment securities, negotiable
instruments and ships, vessels, hovercraft or aircraft. Convention art. 2.
9. See Convention arts. 3,4 and 5 for specific areas that the Convention does not cover.
10. Convention art. 6: "The parties may exclude the application of this Convention or, subject
to article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions."
Id.
I.
12. To exclude the application of theConvention from acontract, one should notmake the simple
statement that the law ofthe U.S. will apply or the law of Louisiana will apply to this contract because
the law will point to the Convention. Instead one should explicitly say that the Convention would not
apply to this contract.
13. For some articles discussing the difficulty of uniformity with the Convention see Ferrari,
supra note 5; Robert A. Hillman, Applying the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale ofGoods: The Elusive Goal ofUniformity, Cornell Rev. ofthe Convention on Cont.
for the Int'l Sale of Goods 21 (1995); John Honnold, The Sales Convention In Action-Uniform
International Words: Uniform Application?, 8 J.L & Com. 207 (1988); John Honnold, The Sales
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their own is difficult in the first place. In tackling this barrier one must also
ovelcome language and cultural differences. And even if it is possible to find
agreement to a uniform set of laws, one still has to determine how to maintain this
uniformity in the interpretation of the law. This paper will focus on the latter
difficulty.
There are different ways one can try to insure uniformity. One might use a
supreme court, or some similar body, to hand down the "true" interpretation of a
law. One might use a principle similar to the common law concept of stare decisis
making case law binding upon future courts. The Convention, however, does not
provide for any superior body to provide the "true" interpretation ofits rules. There
is also little interest in creating a body to review decisions under the Convention
because merchants generally prefer quick, efficient settlements to their disputes;
such a body would create delay. 4
The Convention instead allows domestic courts and arbitrators to be the sole
interpreters. It directs these interpreters, in Convention Article 7(1), to keep in
mind the "international character [of the Convention], the need to promote
uniformity... and the observance of good faith in international trade." This is the
primary means by which the Convention seeks to ensure uniformity of
interpretation. Domestic courts and arbitrators must rise to the occasion, follow the
directive ofArticle 7(1), and interpret the Convention in a uniform manner. This
means interpreting the Convention autonomously from domestic conceptions of
sales law.
Early commentators were optimistic and excited about the Convention. They
were excited that so many countries were able to agree on a uniform sales law and
optimistic that, with this worldwide agreement, international sales law would
become much more unified." These commentators were aware of the difficulties
that lay ahead in achieving the desired uniformity, in particular the difficulty of
getting national judges to interpret the Convention autonomously and not through
the lense ofdomestic law. However, the commentators believed that, with proper
care, this could be accomplished.
After ten years ofcase law, some commentators have grown pessimistic in their
appraisal.' 6 Given the scarcity of case law in some jurisdictions, 7 the use in some
jurisdictions ofdomestic law to interpret the Convention," and a tendency in some

Convention: From Idea to Practice, 17 J.L. & Con. 181 (1998).
14. John Honnold, Uniform Laws for International Trade: Early "Care and Feeding-for
Uniform Growth, I Int'l Trade & Bus. LJ. 1,5 (Australia 1995).
15. See Professor John Honnold's introduction in his treatise, Uniform Law for International
Sales: Under the 1980 United Nations Convention (1982).
16. See supra note 2.
17. Most notably, in the U.S. only 16 cases discuss the Convention, several mentioning it only
in passing. For acurrent update ofcase law from around the world, see the Convention database, supra
note 6.
18. For a U.S. court proceeding in this manner see Calzaturificio Claudia, S.n.c. v. Olivieri
Footwear, Ltd., No.96-8052,1998 WL 164824 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.7, 1998) (stating"Article 2of the [UCC]
may... be used to interpret the CISG where the provisions in each statute contain similar language.").
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9
jurisdictions to ignore the Convention where it is applicable, some commentators
now believe that obstacles to uniformity are greater than once thought, suggesting
that the Convention might not be a success. As noted previously, there are some
who claim the Convention actually harms the goal it attempts to
promote-decreasing legal risk by imposing a body oflaw that is less specific and
20
Indeed, because the
less defined than current domestic systems of law.
the Convention
commentary,
or
law
case
to
as
limited
and
new
is
Convention
words, the
other
In
law.
sales
international
to
confusion
more
arguably brings
risk and
legal
more
created
Convention,
the
enacting
by
community,
international
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of
set
a
new
creating
by
uncertainty
more
While there is perhaps some credence to the argument that the Convention
creates more legal risk because it has a less defined area of case law, this objection
should fade with time, as a body ofcase law builds around the Convention. Indeed,
there are now over 400 decisions world-wide discussing the Convention. Given that
case law and commentary will continue to build, the Convention may one day have
as deep an analysis as any country's code oflaws.
As for the commentators who are now concerned that countries will not be able
to divorce their domestic ideas of sales law from their analysis ofthe Convention,
there needs to be a reappraisal of the uniformity that we expect to achieve through
the Convention.2 The Convention does not cover all areas of sales law and, in fact,
leaves some extremely important areas of sales law, such as the validity of the
contract and products liability to individual countries. It also allows a court to turn
to private international law if the court is unable to find a provision or a general
principle that governs a particular situation. Proceeding in this way, there is no way
for the Convention to achieve perfect uniformity. Even in those areas that the
Convention clearly governs, there will be differences ofinterpretationjust as courts
within domestic systems have differences of interpretation of their "uniform law."

This is not detrimental to the goal of the Convention.
The Convention provides a modern, uniform text of rules that govern
international sales contracts and,inparticular, allows the party's contracts andcustoms
to rule their affairs. It provides the international legal and business community with
a good text and structure that they can debate on common ground and thereby arrive
at a greater level of uniformity in international sales law. However, because of the
diverse group ofcountries that are interpreting its provisions, the Convention will not
and can not bring to international sales a perfect or even a high level of uniformity.
This is not to say that it will not provide a useful level ofuniformity. What is needed
now is patience and work towards making signatory countries' courts and lawyers
aware ofthe Convention and its unique problems of interpretation.
19. See Nova Tool& Mold Inc. v. London Indus., Inc., No. 97-GD'41311 Ontario Court (General
Division) Dec. 16, 1998 (Canadian decision mentioning that the Convention might apply to this
transaction but then quoting only Canadian law and cases in deciding the case).
20. See Stephan, supra note 2, at 760; see also Walt, supra note 2, at 672.
21. For an article discussing this thesis see Harry M. Flechtner, The Several Texts ofthe CISG
in a Decentralized System: Observations on Translations. Reservations and other Challenges to the
Uniformity Principle in Article 7(, 17 J.l_ & Com. 187 (1998).

2001]

COMMENTS

III. How

TO INTERPRET THE CONVENTION TO BRING ABOUT A USEFUL LEVEL
OF UNIFORMITY

Assuming that the Convention will not effect perfect uniformity in international

sales law, how should one go about interpreting the Convention in order to obtain
a useful level ofuniformity? The interpretation should start with the text. But when
looking to the text, the court should consider the international character of the

Convention as Article 7 directs the court to do. When interpreting the Convention,
courts must not only consider the difference between Common and Civil law, but
they must also consider the difference between the East and the West, third-world
countries and industrialized nations, and socialist and free-market countries.' The
temptation to turn to domestic sales law, being the law with which one is familiar,
to interpret the Convention should be avoided.
The European Court of Justice expressed a concept of interpretation of
European Community law that interpreters ofthe Convention could benefit from.
In Srl Cilft v. Ministry of Health,2" the court stated "[E]very provision of
Community law must be placed in its context and interpreted in the light of the
provisions ofCommunity law as a whole, regard being had to the objectives thereof
and to its state of evolution at the date on which the provision in question is to be
applied."' This is an organic concept of Community law. There is no one true
static interpretation ofCommunity law. Instead, interpretations are made in relation
to the written laws, history, and current status ofthe European Community and its
objectives.
One might argue that the Convention is different from the European
Community because the Convention is an unchanging code while the European
Community is changing as new laws and treaties are written. Therefore, it is natural
to have an evolving European Community while the true Convention requirements
should remain static. A fair analysis ofthe Convention, however, will show that the
Convention has the intention ofgrowing and evolving with international sales law.
It places primary importance on the contract as it is written, but perhaps more
importantly on the customs and usages that the parties have adopted within their
industry. Only after observing these matters do the Convention's provisions apply.
Customs and usages are not static matters. The international trade community's
customs and usages are always evolving. Therefore, the terrain to which the
Convention applies will inevitably change and the interpretations ofthe Convention
will have to change accordingly. That which is reasonable or a fundamental breach
at one time may not be so at a later date. Thus, it is natural to conceive of the
Convention, based on its own terms, as an evolving set oflaws, instead ofone static
code that has one uniform interpretation that may be applied. Thinking about the

22. See Sara G. Zwart, The New International Law of Sales: A Marriage Between Socialist,
Third World, Common, and Civil Law Principles, 13 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 109 (1988).

23.

Case 238/81, (1982) E.C.R. 3415.

24.

Id. at #20.
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Convention in this way allows one to escape from the rigid concept ofuniformity
that many commentators seem to urge or think is the goal ofthe Convention.
Although there is no one static interpretation ofthe Convention, it does provide
a clear structure for courts to use when interpreting its provisions. The Convention
is intended to fully govern the law of the formation ofa contract and the rights and
25
obligations of the parties to a contract. When it has not answered a question
within this realm directly, then one should decide the case in conformity with
general principles of the Convention. Article 7(l)'s requirements of regard to
international character, uniformity of application and observance of good faith in
international trade should guide the search for general principles. Only when the
Convention yields no governing principle should the judge consult outside
2 Article 7(2) refers not to "the gaps intra legem, i.e., the matters that are
sources."
excluded from the scope of application ofthe Convention, such as (validity ofthe
issues to which the Convention applies
contract), but the gaps praeter legem, i.e.,
27
resolve."
but which it does not expressly
There is still some disagreement over how to fill praeter legem gaps.
Advocates from common-law countries have argued that gaps should be filled by
domestic legislation even when a solution can be found within the principles ofthe
Convention.28 This is generally the method that a common-lawjudge would apply
to a statute that does not expressly prescribe the law; he would turn to the common
law for the answer and not some principle garnered from the statute. The
Convention, however, clearly adopts in Article 7(2) more ofa Civil-Law approach
by directing the interpreter ofthe Convention to decide the case in conformity with
general principles from the Convention. It is like a code that preempts a field of
law. It requires the judge to look to the general principles first, and only "in the
absence of such principles, [then] in conformity with the law applicable by virtue
ofthe rules ofprivate international law." This compromise was intended to appease
the common-law countries. Looking to private international law would mean that
where there was an absence ofgeneral principles to be found in the Convention, the
court should look to the country's conflict-of-law rules and apply the proper
domestic legislation. This, however, should be the rare case. A judge normally
should be able to find a general principle to fill the gap.
What sources can help to interpret the Convention when a gap needs to be
filled? First, as already mentioned, one should proceed by analogy using the
general principles ofthe Convention. While there are sometimes conflicts, there are
some general principles that can be derived such as freedom of contract, the duty
One can also interpret the
to act reasonably, and the duty to perform in good faith."
° and travauxpriparatoires,i.e.
law,'
case
Convention by consulting doctrine, prior
25. See Convention arts. I and 7(2). Specific questions within the realm of formation ofthe
contract and the obligations of the parties to a sale are prescribed by the Convention.
26. See Convention art. 7(2).
27. Ferrari, supra note 5,at 217.
28. See Hillman, supra note 13.
29. Id.at 23.
30. This prior case law could come from any jurisdiction.
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legislative history ofthe Convention." Finally, one should always keep in mind that
the contract is governed by any usage "which the parties knew or ought to have
known and which in international trade is widely known to and regularly observed
by parties to contracts ofthe type involved in the particular trade concerned." 2
Many authors have argued that using prior case law to interpret the Convention
is a useful means ofensuring uniform interpretations. However, there is question
as to whether this case law should be binding or simply persuasive. The argument
for making it binding is that it would be a means ofmaking the interpretation of the
Convention uniform. Some authors have pointed out the danger ofusing case law
as precedent. 3 Their concern is that one should not be locked into a foolish
interpretation of the Convention for the sake of uniformity. They argue, further,
that the goal of the Convention is not, as stated in its own terms, uniformity alone,
but also concern for interpreting a contract with its international character in mind
and with the purpose of promoting good faith.'
It cannot be argued that the Convention itself requires the courts to apply the
principle of stare decisis and make prior case law binding. The only Article that
might be interpreted to require stare decisis would be Article 7(l)'s directive to
have "regard" to uniformity when interpreting the Convention. However the word
chosen is "regard" which does not suggest a requirement to achieve uniformity at
all costs. Therefore, a reasonable reading of this Convention directive would be
that it requires a principle similar to jurisprudenceconstante, a principle from
Civil- Law legal systems. This principle holds that case law is not a binding source
oflaw, but a persuasive source oflaw. This would mean that when interpreting the
Convention, a court should look to other court's interpretations ofthe Convention,
including the interpretations ofcourts from other countries. These interpretations,
however, would not be binding, but only persuasive.
The use in the U.S. of case law to interpret the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) can serve as a model for courts using case law to interpret the Convention."
No state within the U.S. is bound by an interpretation of the UCC from another
state, but the interpretations of the UCC from other jurisdictions are extremely
persuasive. While this method does not achieve exact uniformity, the U.S. has
achieved a level of uniformity of sales law that is useful to companies transacting
business in many states.
There have been calls for the addition of comments to the Convention as the
U.S. has for its UCC, and there has also been a call to have a body within
UNCITRAL to issue opinions as to the correct interpretation of the Articles ofthe
Convention.' Although both ideas might be useful, it is rather unlikely that either
will occur. With fifty-seven countries party to the Convention, finding agreement
as to this matter would be difficult. The two ideas, however, are not necessary to
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

The Convention database, supra note 6, provides an extensive database of these sources.
Convention art. 9(2).
See Hillman, supra note 13; see also Flechtner,supra note 21, at 211.
See Flechtner, supra note 21, at 214.
Id.
Bailey, supra note 2,at 276.
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the goal ofuniformity. As mentioned, doctrine and legislative history are perfectly
reasonable, instructive sources and both will provide guidance to the judge looking
for the proper interpretation. Many universities and institutions around the world,
including Pace University, have established databases that have much of this
7

information online for ready access.1
Judges and lawyers should remember that the object of the Convention is to
bring about an international trade community, and interpret it accordingly." When

a domestic court is interpreting the Convention, it should realize that it is
contributing to this text on an international level. While it will continue to be

difficult to achieve uniformity, one can come closer to reaching this international
community through an international discussion between courts and scholars, always
recognizing the other systems at hand.
IV. REVIEW OF SELECT CASE LAW ARISING UNDER THE CONVENTION

The current state ofjurisprudence under the Convention suggests that it is going
to take some time before signatory countries to the Convention understand how to
interpret the Conventionproperly. Thus far, companies, attorneys andjudges fromthe
U.S. have been slow to adopt the Convention into usage and have not always
39
interpreted the Convention properly. There are some cases, however, that suggest
that U.S. courts can and will move in the direction of interpreting the Convention in
conformity with its international character.' There is further evidence that healthy
4
debates are occurring on an international level regarding the Convention. This
section will discuss these issues.
Most cases involving the Convention have occurred in European courts,
especially in Germany.' 2 To date, only seventeen cases in the U.S. discuss the
4
Convention, several mentioning it only in passing. 1 This is strange considering the
U.S. presence in international transactions. John Honnold, a Convention scholar and
a member of the committee that drafted the Convention, has suggested a few reasons
for this scarcity in the U.S.:
(1) Our lawyers are not litigious; [laughter] (2) Our court dockets are so
overcrowded that protracted delays discourage suit and encourage
37. See Convention database, supra note 6.
38. See Amy H. Kastely, Uniflcation and Community: A Rhetorical Analysis of the United
Nations Sales Convention, 8 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 574 (1988).
39. See text accompanying infra notes 46-50 discussing Beijing Metals & Minerals v. American
Bus. Ctr., Inc., 993 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1993).
40. See text accompanying infra notes 58-62 regarding Medical Mktg. Int'l, Inc. v. Intemazionale
Medico Scientifica, S.R.L., No. 99-0380, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7380 (E.D. La. May 17,1999) (first
U.S. case to interpret the Convention with guidance from a court outside the U.S.).
41. See text accompanying infra notes 63-64 regarding the debate over what the term interest
means.
42. For a current update of case law from around the world, see Convention database supra
note 6.
43. Id.
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settlement and (3) The great majority of cases are in central
Europe-countries that had a decade or so of satisfactory experience with
the predecessor to the CISG, the 1964 Hague Convention that provided
uniform rules for international sales. [Discussion from the floor by the
European scholars supported the third alternative.]"
Adding to the third reason suggested by Honnold is that many American lawyers

appear hesitant to recommend that a client make the Convention applicable to their
contract because ofthe sparse case law on the matter and the consequent uncertainty. 5
They would prefer to use a body oflaw with which they are familiar.
This sparse case law makes it hard to detect any real trends in U.S. Convention
jurisprudence. From what case law exists, BeijingMetals & Minerals v. American
Business Center,Inc.' illustrates the fears of the commentators that courts will turn

to domestic law to interpret the Convention rather than providing an autonomous
interpretation. The court in Beying Metals found that the Texas parol evidence rule
applied to a dispute whether the Convention was involved or not' 7
A Chinese manufacturer (Beijing) had entered into a contract with an American
company (ABC) to supply weight lifting equipment. Beijing sued ABC for failure to
pay on the contract ABC argued that oral agreements between the parties had been

made that were a defense to their failure to pay on the contract. The court applied the
Texas parol evidence rule and excluded the oral agreements as a possible defense.'
Ina footnote, however, it said the Convention might apply to this dispute, but "we
need not resolve this choice of law issue, because our discussion is limited to
application ofthe parol evidence rule [which applies regardless]." 9 Thus, without any
analysis ofthe Convention articles, the court asserted that the Convention included
Texas' parol evidence rule."
While it has been argued that the parol evidence rule is consistent with the
Convention," most authorities agree that the American substantive rule ofparol

44. John 0. Honnold, Symposium-Ten Years ofthe UnitedNations Sales Convention, The Sales
Convention: From Idea to Practice, 17 J.L. & Com. 181, 183 (1998).
45. Kritzer International Contract Manual: International Sales Law Reporter: Guides to Practical
Application of the CISG (1989).
46. 993 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1993).
47. Id. at 1182-83 n.9.
48. Id. at 1182-83.
49. Id. at 1182-83 n.9.
50. It is questionable whether the Convention should have even been applied to this case.
Although the original contract was a contract for the sale of goods, the contract in dispute was
characterized by the court as a novation ofthe original contract into a contract to settle a disputed claim.
While if the later agreement were simply a modification of the first contract of sale, the Convention
would still apply, but where the contract has been novated, a contract ofsale is no longer implicated and
the Convention would not apply. See Joseph Lookofsky, Understanding the CISG in the USA, 13
(1995).
51. See David H. Moore, The Parol Evidence Rule and the United Nations Convention on
Contractsfor the International Sale of Goods: Justi5ng Beijing Metals & Minerals Import/Export
Corp. v. American Business Center, Inc., BYU L. Rev. 1347 (1995).
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evidence is not part of the Convention. 2 However, regardless of whether the
parol evidence rule could be included as a general principle ofthe Convention,
the wild assertion that it is part of the Convention, without any analysis, is just
the type of interpretation that Article 7 directs courts away from. Fortunately,
other U.S. courts have found that the parol evidence rule is inconsistent with
the Convention and have not followed the precedent of BeijingMetals. 3
U.S. courts have also been guilty of making the general, misleading
assertion that where language from the Convention is analogous to a domestic
provision, the Convention can be interpreted in line with the domestic
provision. One court has said, "caselaw interpreting analogous provisions of
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), may also inform a court
54
where the language of the relevant CISG provisions tracks that of the UCC."
While this is not an unqualified endorsement of the proposition that the UCC
and the Convention mean the same thing, it is a misleading statement.55 As
discussed previously, interpretation of the Convention should be a wholly
autonomous matter. Turning to domestic law for interpretive authority has the
strong possibility of tainting the interpretation of the Convention.
For instance, the UCC and the Convention on some points reach quite
different results in sales law problems, notably the "battle of the forms"
problem. In contract formation, the Convention adopted the "mirror image"
rule. 56 This means that someone must accept an offer in the exact material
terms in which the offer was made. If there are any material differences, the
"acceptance" is a counter-offer instead of an actual acceptance. There is no
doubt that the term "material" will lead to much litigation, but the general tenor
of the Article is that acceptance must be substantially similar to the offer. With
the UCC, however, one can quite easily accept an offer with different terms
than in the offer if the offeror does not timely object."1 If a court interpreted
the Convention in light of the UCC provision on formation of contract, one
would have a more liberal approach to contract formation than the Convention
Articles indicate should be applied.
While U.S. courts have not always approached the Convention with the
international perspective that Article 7 directs the courts to adopt, the U.S. does
have one of the few cases internationally that actually looks to case law from
another country. This key U.S. arbitration case, the first in the U.S. to cite
Convention case law from a foreign tribunal, occurred in Louisiana.58 In 1993,
52. See Honnold, supra note 1S, at I 10; Lookofsky, supra note 50, at 44.
53. See Filanto S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 984 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1993).
54. Delchi Carrier S.p.A. v. Rotorex Inc., 71 F.3d 1024, 1028 (2d Cir. 1995).
55. That statement, in fact, lead a later court to say. "Article 2 of the [UCC] may... be used to
interpret the CISG where the provisions in each statute contain similar language." Calzaturificio
Claudia S.n.c. v. Olivieri Footwear Ltd., No. 96-8052, 1999 WL 164924 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1998).
56. See Convention art. 19.
57. See U.C.C. § 2-207.
58. Medical Marketing International, Inc. v. Intemazionale Medico Scientifica, S.R.L, No. 990380, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7380 (E.D. La. May 17, 1999).
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Medical Marketing International, (MMI), a Louisiana corporation, entered into
an agreement with Internazionale Medico Scientifica, (IMS), an Italian
corporation that manufactured radiology devices in Italy. IMS granted MMI
the exclusive rights to market its mammography unit in the United States. In
1996, after MMI had purchased some units, the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) determined that IMS was not in compliance with the FDA's Good
Manufacturing Practices for Medical Device Regulations.
MMI declared IMS in breach and cancelled the contract. The parties
disagreed as to who was responsible for ensuring that the units met the
standards of the FDA. When they were unable to work out their differences,
MMI submitted the case to an arbitration panel pursuant to the contract. The
arbitrators found that the Convention applied to the case. Though the
Convention was not clear on the point of responsibility for meeting the
standards, the arbitrators cited a German case that held that the buyer was
generally responsible. However, the arbitrators found that under an exception
to the rule cited by the German court, IMS had breached the contract because
it either knew or should have been aware of the FDA regulations.
On appeal to the U.S. District Court, IMS argued that the arbitration panel
improperly applied the Convention by not adhering to the German Federal
Supreme Court holding. The District Court held, however, that the arbitration
panel properly followed the German precedent, but that this case fit within the
exception to the rule. The question presented to the arbitration panel was
which party should be responsible for meeting specific regulations when the
contract did not state who should bear this burden. In a different sense, the
question was whether the goods provided by IMS conformed to the contract.
The arbitrators believed Article 35 of the Convention, which determined
whether the good was of the quality specified of the contract, was the
applicable provision. 9
The arbitrators, at the prompting ofIMS's counsel, looked to a German Federal
Supreme Court interpretation ofArticle 35.' In this German case, a German buyer
purchased mussels from a Swiss seller. Over a month after delivery of the mussels,
the buyer notified the seller that the mussels were not of the proper quality. When
the buyer refused to pay for the mussels, the seller sued for the price ofthe mussels.

59. Convention art. 35 states in pertinent part:
(1) The seller must deliver goods which are ofthe quantity, quality anddescription required
by the contract and which are contained orpackaged in the manner required by the contract.
(2) Except where the parties have agreed otherwise, the goods do not conform with the
contract unless they:
(a) are fit for the purposes for which the goods of the same description would
ordinarily be used;
(b) are fit for anyparticular purpose expressly or impliedlymade known tothe seller
at the time ofthe conclusion of the contract, except where the circumstances show
that the buyer did not rely, or that it was unreasonable for him to rely, on the seller's
skill and judgement.
60. Entscheidunger des Bundersgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen(BGHZ) 129, 75 (1995).
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The court found that under Article 39(1)61 the buyer had failed to give notice of
non-conformity within a "reasonable time." Although Article 39(1) had settled the
case, the court also interpreted Article 35. The court held that a seller is normally
not responsible for the regulations in the buyer's country, but special circumstances
may provide an exception to this rule, particularly if the seller knew or should have
known of the regulations ofthe buyer's country. 2
Using the German interpretation of Article 35, the arbitrators in Medical
MarketingInternationalv. InternazionaleMedico Scientifica concluded that IMS
was aware of the FDA regulations from prior sales of equipment in the U.S. and
was, therefore, responsible for meeting the regulations. They noted that IMS had
made indications to MMI in 1992 that its equipment met all the requirements ofthe
FDA, allowing MMI to reasonably rely on this statement. The arbitrators stated,
"we conclude that the combination of the foregoing factors amounts to 'special
circumstances' which constitute an exception to the general rule under the CISG
that a seller is not responsible for compliance with governmental safety regulations
enforced at the buyer's place of business."
This case raises the question of the importance, previously discussed, of case
law in the interpretation of the Convention. Should courts apply stare decisis and
consider prior case law binding? Or, should case law serve only as persuasive
authority? The Convention does not indicate that case law is the law or becomes
a part of the Convention. It simply directs courts to regard the need to promote
uniformity and recognize the fact that the Convention is a body oflaw to be applied
internationally. This does not lead to the conclusion that stare decisis should apply
to interpretations of the Convention. Instead, the language ofArticle 7 suggesting
that a court have "regard" to uniformity indicates that case law only provides

persuasive value similar to that embodied in the concept ofjurisprudenceconstante
of civil law systems.
The fact that the arbitrators looked to a foreign tribunal's decision in an effort
to interpret a Convention article is justified. This is the first time that this has
occurred in the U.S. and one of the few times that it has occurred in Convention
jurisprudence. Proceeding in this manner is part of Article 7's directive.
However, if the arbitrator's holding stands for the proposition that the German
interpretation of Article 35 was binding, then this is going a bit too far. A better
analysis would have consisted of looking at the text of Article 35, and
considering it in light ofthe general principles of the Convention and the German

61. "The buyer loses the right to rely on alack of conformity of the goods if he does not give
notice to the seller specifying the nature of the lack ofconformity within areasonable time after he has
discovered it or ought to have discovered it."
62. The exceptions included:
(I)if the public laws and regulations of the buyer's state are identical to those enforced in
the seller's state; (2) if the buyer informed the seller about those regulations; or (3) if due
to "special circumstance," such as the existence of a seller's branch office in the buyer's
state, the seller knew or should have known about the regulations at issue.
Translation quoted from Medical Marketing International, INC. v. internazionale Medico Scientifica,
S.R.L., No. 99-0380, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7380 (E.D. La. May 17, 1999).
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court's interpretation of the Article. The arbitrators could then determine that the
German court's interpretation was a wise one and follow its lead.
Clearly enunciating and following a correct procedure in interpreting the
Convention is particularly important with international sales law that is intended
to be uniform. Future courts and arbitrators from around the world will be
reviewing the case law and will be inevitably influenced by how the Convention
has been interpreted. With the language and cultural barrier involved, being
unclear in analysis can only lead to a breakdown in our ability to communicate
our understanding of the Convention with other legal systems. If this breaks
down, we lose the value of a uniform sales law because each country interprets
it in its own way.
A great example, in Convention case law, of the discussion that can go on
internationally as to the provisions of the Convention has occurred in a debate
over the definition of "interest" in Convention Article 78. It requires delinquent
payors to pay interest on the money they failed to pay.63 The Article, however,
does not define what interest is owed. Many courts have found that this issue is
settled neither by the express articles of the Convention, nor by the general
principles ofthe Convention. Therefore, the court must turn to the rules of private
international law." The court would consult its conflict-of-law rules and apply
the interest provisions of the country to which those rules pointed.
An Austrian arbitration case however made an interesting contrary
finding.65 The arbitrator, a Convention scholar named Professor Bonell, found
that a buyer was allowed to recover interest and held that the interest to be paid
was a matter to be defined by the Convention and not a gap to be filled by
domestic law. He reasoned that because domestic law could occasionally
provide that no interest was due-a conclusion contrary to the
Convention-that the rule must be within the Convention instead. The general
principle he argued was that someone should be fully compensated for his loss.
Because the damaged party would likely have to borrow from a local bank, the
interest rate of the damaged party's country should be used as the proper rate
of interest.
While these may be conflicting decisions, and therefore not "uniform," they
show a healthy debate as to what the Convention requires. Just as the U.S. has
within its law a majority and minority view on many topics of law, including the
UCC, the Convention will also have different views as to what the Convention
requires. The lack of certainty in this provision does not show that the Convention
63. Convention art. 78: "ifaparty fails to pay the price or any other sum that isin arrears, the
other party isentitled to interest on it, without prejudice to any claim for damages recoverable under
Article 74."
64. For an example ofacourt making thisargument see Arbitration Court of Budapest Chamber

of Commerce and Industry (Case law on UNCITRAL texts (CLOUT) abstract no. 163 MAGYAR
KERESKEDELMI tS IPARKAMARAmeIlett szervezett VALASZTOTrBIR6SAG Dec.10, 1996
VB/96074).
65. AUSTRIA: Arbitral Tribunal--Vienna June 15, 1994, SCH-431 8 (Case law on UNCITRAL

texts (CLOUT) abstract no. 94).
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is a useless document that cannot lead to uniformity but instead is a symptom ofthe
impossibility of providing absolute certainty with words. What the debate does
show is that the Convention provides a uniform document that did not exist before,
that can allow courts and scholars to discuss international law with a common
vocabulary. In this way, the international community can come closer to the vision
ofa uniform law of sales.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Convention has not brought perfect uniformity to the international law of
sales. This is an impossible goal. Its goal of bringing more predictability to
international sales law, however, is a useful and possible goal. As more case law
and commentary on the Convention develops, courts will apply the Convention with
more regularity, and practitioners will be more likely to recommend the use ofthe
Convention. This will bring more predictability to international sales law. Getting
courts and practitioners from 57 countries to use and properly apply the Convention
is not something that can happen overnight or even within ten years. What is
essential is that scholars continue to write articles critiquing court decisions and
making broad analysis ofConvention articles. By focusing first on the words ofthe
Convention and the principles found therein, courts will go a long way towards
meeting the directive of achieving uniformity in the law.
PhilipHackney

